Dear Pitt Community Members:
 
Last night’s response to a false alarm of a potential active killer in Hillman Library on our Pittsburgh campus has caused widespread fear and concern. It follows last month’s false threat at high schools near our Pittsburgh campus. Such events have raised questions about our ability to effectively manage these threats to our safety. I agree with these concerns and, because such threats are not going away, we must do better.
 
What we are faced with now are two different but related types of threats. The first is the threat of an active killer on or near our campus. These types of attacks are too common and too real. The “textbook” response to a potential active killer event involves two groups: innocent bystanders and police. Pitt’s current training efforts focus on teaching innocent bystanders to avoid becoming victims by adopting the Run, Hide, Fight strategy. At the same time, law enforcement rapidly mobilizes to quickly intercept and disable, disarm or kill the potential killer. An effective police response is also a dangerous one; it moves very quickly when accurate information is scarce and officers are fully armed and prepared to use force to secure an area from the threat. It involves quickly warning the public to stay away from a specific area in question or, absent location specifics, lock down a broader area and have its occupants shelter in place. Learning these steps is a sad but vital part of our lives for navigating this type of threat.
 
In addition to dealing with a potential active killer, we are also facing a new type of threat: the leveraging of false information to deliberately exploit the response to an active killer scenario. This type of false alarm is sometimes referred to as a “hoax,” “swatting” or “prank call,” but it is, by and large, a terroristic disinformation attack. It cases real harm, traumatizes victims and requires the rapid mobilization of a full-scale response from law enforcement. Unfortunately, it seems that the more these attacks achieve their intended reaction, the more they are likely to recur.
 
Today, we face a new challenge of simultaneously dealing with both types of threats. In two short weeks, we have experienced two of these disinformation attacks—one last night and the other less than two weeks prior. Both incidents followed actual killer attacks in other parts of the country and escalated the fear, confusion, panic and danger that such tragedies can cause.
 
Ideally, we would know which threat we are facing and responding accordingly. Unfortunately, a disinformation attack exploits the fact that this information is initially missing and that we must consider a threat valid until we can prove otherwise. These attacks also exploit the very approaches we use to respond to an active killer scenario, including our ENS alert messaging system, training and immediate police response. This early “window of uncertainty” is a period where confusion, conflicting reports, widespread dissemination of rumors and incorrect information are common, and these factors complicate the fact-finding process.

These attacks can cause real and repeated trauma to those experiencing constant emergency alerts, and the large and aggressive law enforcement response puts nearby community members at risk. False alarms, made again and again, can also desensitize our community and degrade our response to a real active killer situation. The bottom line is that we must be prepared to simultaneously deal with both types of threats—an active killer scenario and a disinformation attack.
 
As I write this, we have already begun a major review of the procedures, policies and tools that we use to respond to and address a disinformation attack. Some steps we are taking include:

  • Reassessing our emergency notification system. Our current emergency notification technology has proved to be insufficient. The problems are both technological but also procedural. We will make whatever changes necessary over the long term and are also exploring immediate ways to make the right information available to the population impacted.
  • Revisiting our standard for sharing information. Normal protocols for emergency messages are designed to be accurate, which can result in delays while information is being validated, often a challenge when responding to an active killer threat. This cautious approach is less effective against a disinformation attack, especially when other communication channels—including social media, news outlets and even word of mouth—are rapidly spreading information (true and false). Sharing information quickly can impact information accuracy, but we also recognize that speed of response matters. We are working to do better on balancing these factors.
  • Educating our community on responding to this new type of threat. Knowing how to get information, take prudent steps to minimize risks to ourselves and those around us, and avoid the dangers of an active law enforcement response is part of our new reality. We must broaden our emergency preparedness program, including training, to provide clearer guidance against these twin threats (a potential active killer situation and a targeted disinformation attack).
  • Aggressively pursuing who is responsible for these attacks. A disinformation attack of this kind does not require the perpetrator to be nearby. We will work closely with regional, state, federal and potentially even international law enforcement to identify and prosecute those making terroristic threats to our university community and deter others interested in threatening our community.

This situation is incredibly frustrating, and I am concerned that this is our new reality. It is a threat that we must take seriously, and it requires a response that will continue to evolve as needed. In this regard, we will be sharing more information in the coming days and weeks—and on an ongoing basis—as we work to navigate this new and dangerous environment.
 
Sincerely,
 
Chancellor Patrick Gallagher